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225 Comptes rendus
Gweltaz Guyomarc’h : L’unité de la métaphysique selon Alexandre d’Aphrodise, 
Paris, Vrin, 2015 (Textes et traditions, 27), 351 p., ISBN : 978-2-7116-2677-9.
Alexander’s extant Metaphysics commentary covering the first five books has been 
traditionally often consulted by the students of Metaphysics for matters textual and 
exegetical, but not much studied on its own as an original work of philosophy. The 
recent growth of interest in ancient philosophical commentary as a vehicle of doing 
philosophy led to a greater appreciation of Alexander as a philosopher, and in the last 
quarter of a century we have seen several studies of his Metaphysics commentary with 
focus on the philosophical project of Alexander and the place of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
in it (the reverse of the traditional order of priorities). The significant landmarks are 
the first English translation of the commentary by Dooley and Madigan (1989-1993), 
the collection of papers edited by Movia (2002), the first Italian translation by the team 
of scholars led by Movia (2007), Maddalena Bonelli’s monograph on metaphysics as 
demonstrative science (2004). There is a lot of new work on the text and tradition of 
Alexander’s commentary, by S.  Fazzo, M.  Hecquet, M.  Kotwick, P.  Golitsis. Pantelis 
Golitsis is preparing a new critical edition of the commentary. All these publications 
come against a background of growing interest in all aspects Alexander’s philosophical 
legacy, with the works by Sharples, Rashed, Caston, Chiaradonna leading the field. The 
new book by Gweltaz Guyomarc’h is another important work on this front. 
The book is devoted to a study of Alexander’s ‘unitarian’ reading of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, as one book and one philosophical project. It consists of three chapters.
The first chapter entitled ‘Alexander, Philosopher and Exegete’, contextualises the 
problem of unity in the philosophical discussions on the age of Alexander, in the work of 
earlier commentators and in Alexander’s own exegetical practice. The author discusses 
the status of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline, in relation to the philosophical 
curriculum of Alexander’s time, still largely dominated by the Hellenistic division into 
logic, physics, and ethics, with the metaphysics, like the Arlesienne of the title play, never 
seen but always present behind the scenes of the philosophical mainstream. In his search 
for the intellectual niche for Aristotle’s Metaphysics the author formulates three criteria 
for the type of philosophical knowledge it represents: universality of scope, rationality 
of methods, and search for the first principles. These criteria are reflected in Alexander’s 
philosophical and exegetical project, which is based on a ‘unitarian’ approach to both 
the composition and the philosophical argument of the treatise. The survey of the titles 
used by Alexander for this new discipline shows his preference for the ‘first philosophy’, 
or ‘first wisdom’, used interchangeably with ‘the study of being qua being’ and ‘theology’ 
from the very beginning throughout. Among Alexander’s predecessors in commenting 
on the Metaphysics, apart from possibly Eudorus, and certainly Aspasius, we should 
mention also Alexander’s teacher Aristotle the Younger, more often referred to as 
Aristotle of Mytilene (In Metaph.  166, 19-20 Hayduck). Another interesting case to 
consider is Aristocles of Messina (perhaps late 1st century BC), who in his work On 
Philosophy uses Aristotle’s arguments in Metaph. 4.4-5 against those who deny the law 
of contradiction as a framework in which to deploy his own criticisms of Pyrrhonists, as 
well as different views on the epistemic status of sense perception, perhaps giving us a 
glimpse of the possible place of Metaphysics in the context of Hellenistic debates. 
The title of the second chapter, ‘Metaphysics as the universal and first science’, 
captures the main tension in Alexander’s treatment of the subject of the first philosophy. 
This chapter forms the core of the book, demonstrating Alexander’s exegetical progress 
through the first five books of the Metaphysics as designed to form a step-by-step 
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realisation of the programme of first philosophy as a demonstrative science of being qua 
being, which also accommodates without inconsistency the task of a study of the first 
principles. 
The author shows that the search for the first principles, far from being a simple 
reduction of all metaphysics to theology narrowly construed, allows Alexander to 
introduce the principle of ‘the causality of the maximum’, on the lines of propter quod 
alia id maximum tale (from ἕǔαǝǞǙǗ ǎὲ ǖάǕǓǝǞα αɩǞὸ ǞῶǗ ἄǕǕωǗ ǔαǒ’ ὃ ǔαὶ ǞǙῖǜ ἄǕǕǙǓǜ 
ɪǚάǛǡǏǓ Ǟὸ ǝǟǗώǗǟǖǙǗ in α 1, 993b24-25, replacing Aristotle’s strict synonymy with 
homonymy). Alexander applies it as a kind of ‘bridge’ principle connecting different 
ontological levels in the Aristotelian system by means on an a fortiori argument, for 
instance, when arguing that the causes of the eternal heavenly bodies are more eternal 
than these bodies. 
The universality of metaphysics is understood by Alexander as direct: every 
x is an object of metaphysics by virtue of its being x, and not just by virtue of being 
causally dependent on some special proper object of metaphysics. Guyomarc’h shows 
how Alexander develops the technical concept of ὕǚαǛǘǓǜ, which could be translated 
as ‘existence’, to articulate the existential mode for each of the kinds of being as 
distinguished in the Categories, without drawing a contrast between essence and existence 
or postulating an ontologically independent existence. ‘Existence’ so understood allows 
both the universal applicability and the non-reductive interpretation of being qua being. 
The author discusses Alexander’s view on epistemic priority of the first philosophy 
in relation to other sciences as being architectonic, foundational, and a model of 
demonstrative science. These features of metaphysics depend on its universality and 
having the first principles as its object, and on its use of the definitional-demonstrative 
model of the Posterior Analytics. At the same time, these features give Alexander’s version 
of the first philosophy resemblance of the mathesis universalis of the kind that is rejected 
by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics. Guyomarc’h’s diagnosis of the source of this ostensible 
departure from Aristotle and towards Plato seems to be that Alexander points out the 
need for the demonstrative science to work on the principles of demonstration, even if in 
a non-demonstrative way, the view that is well-received by the Platonist commentators 
(p.164-65). But it is not clear that Alexander’s reasons for his claim are the same as 
those of the Platonists for embracing it: his understanding of the role of dialectic as 
contributing towards the first principles is certainly much more circumscribed compared 
to the scope of Platonic dialectic (cf. Alexander in Metaph. 174, 2-4 and discussion in 
his Topics commentary)  
Guyomarc’h resists reading Alexander as dealing with two fundamentally different 
metaphysical projects, the ‘general’ metaphysics with a direct universal scope and the 
‘special’ metaphysics with focussing on the first principles, where unification could only 
be achieved as a reduction of one project to the other. He points out that for Alexander, 
this science is both universal and first. In a meticulous study of the three problematic 
passages which appear to give divergent views on the nature of metaphysics and its place 
in the relation to other kinds of philosophical knowledge ((1) first philosophy in general, 
‘under which’ there are (i) first philosophy understood closer to theology, (ii) physics, 
(iii) ethics (245, 25-246, 13); (2) first philosophy = theology; second philosophy = 
astronomy; third philosophy = physics (250, 21-251, 38); (3) defending the view of first 
philosophy as both the study of the first principles and all being as a whole, distinguishing 
this one discipline from physics, 266, 5-18), Guyomarc’h shows how the passages can be 
seen as different progressive stages of the same strategy rather than a series of random 
inconsistent ad hoc remarks. He discusses the place of logic in Alexander’s metaphysical 
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project as the product of the first philosophy, and offers some very interesting remarks 
on the first passage above showing how metaphysics subsumes logic and takes its place in 
the old tripartite Hellenistic division.
The third chapter ‘The objects of metaphysics’ shows how the results of this analysis 
of the scope and tasks of metaphysics can be applied to explain in a unified way the 
variety of objects this science deals with, from the most widely dispersed non-substantial 
being to the most unique first unmoved mover. Since the link between the higher and 
lower ontological orders is construed as explanatory/causal, this leads us to the discussion 
of the mechanism of the three types of causation: the causation of substance with 
relation to non-substantial beings, the causation of form with respect to substance, and 
the causation of the separate form, the first unmoved mover, in relation to the human 
intellect and to the world as a whole (theology). In all three cases, the ‘bridge’ principle 
of the causality of the maximum described above is deployed in order to provide a link 
between the different ontological levels. This principle works to explain the causal 
priority of substance over non-substantial beings, without making the latter the mere 
tropes of the former: to ensure this, Alexander develops the concept of  a kind of being 
that is ‘intermediate’ between the substance and the accident that is fully dependent 
on a substance: the corresponding relation is that of ‘strong’ homonymy ἀǠ’ἑǗόǜ and 
πǛὸǜ ἕǗ, between the substance and the related non-substances. The same principle of 
causal priority works also in the case of form-substance over composite substance. This 
section is most interesting in light of the recent discussions of Alexander’s essentialism 
vs attributivism of earlier Peripatetics (Andronicus, Boethus). Guyomarc’h argues that 
Alexander’s account of form-substance can in fact accommodate Boethus’ view of form 
as a quality as a partial or incomplete account to the extent that it agrees with the causal 
priority of substance. Particularly interesting and apt is Guyomarc’h’s explanation (even 
if written out in broad strokes) of how the causality of the maximum works in Alexander’s 
noetics, to explain the relation between the divine intellect and human intellect. This 
argument in Alexander’s De anima (88, 26-89, 11) is often taken by readers to be a 
Platonic influence, and showing its roots in Alexander’s considered interpretation of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics is thus a very important result. 
On the whole, the book is excellent, very rich, thought provoking, engaging, 
eminently readable. Guyomarc’h has not only worked with great care through many 
little studied texts of Alexander and provided a convincing account of Alexander’s 
overall argument in the Metaphysics commentary. He has also done an exemplary work 
of finding the place of this argument with all its complex developments in modern 
discussions of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, with which he is fully engaged throughout the 
book, making many interesting suggestions and shedding new light on many old and 
controversial topics. This is a very significant contribution to the field, and a must read 
for all students of Alexander and Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 
Inna Kupreeva
University of Edinburgh
Wilhelm Kroll, Discours sur les oracles chaldaïques, traduction par H. D. Safrey, 
Paris, Vrin, 2016 (Textes et traditions, 28), 126 p., ISBN : 978-2-7116-2746-2.
(Toutes références données aux pages de la traduction, et non de l’œuvre originale 
traduite).
Plus d’un siècle après sa première parution (Breslau 1894), la dissertation latine de 
W. Kroll (ci-après : K.), ouvrage majeur qui fit accéder l’étude des Oracles chaldaïques 
(ci-après  : OC) à un statut scientifique, trouve une seconde naissance à travers la 
